

Some Applications of Set Theory in Proof Theory

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- This resulted in the ε -calculus.
- Essentially, ε -calculus = propositional logic + ε .
- More precisely, one adds to zeroth-order logic (that is, first-order logic without quantifiers) terms of the form $\varepsilon_x A(x)$, where 'x' is a (bound) variable.

- If $A(\cdot)$ is a predicate, $\varepsilon_x A(x)$ means “something of which A holds, if it does of anything; and an arbitrary object, otherwise.”

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$$\frac{A(t)}{A(\varepsilon_x A(x))}$$

“from $A(t)$ for some t , infer $A(\varepsilon_x A(x))$.”

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 - This is syntactically captured by the rule:

$$\frac{A(\varepsilon_x \neg A(x))}{A(t)}$$

“from $A(\varepsilon_x \neg A(x))$, infer $A(t)$ for any t .”

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 - The translation of $\exists x \exists y A(x, y)$ is thus obtained by substituting $\varepsilon_x A(x, \varepsilon_y A(x, y))$ for x in $A(x, \varepsilon_y A(x, y))$:
 - $A(\varepsilon_x A(x, \varepsilon_y A(x, y)), \varepsilon_y A(\varepsilon_x A(x, \varepsilon_y A(x, y)), y))$.

- The ε -calculus: add to a Hilbert-style axiomatization of propositional logic all formulae of the form
 - $A(t) \rightarrow A(\varepsilon_x A(x))$, and
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 - $A(\varepsilon_x A(x))$ means $\exists x A(x)$;
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- $(A(x) \leftrightarrow B(x)) \rightarrow \varepsilon_x A(x) = \varepsilon_x B(x)$ need not be an axiom.

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Can there be an infinitary analog of the ε -calculus? For example, can one find an analog of $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1\omega_1}$?

- If so, it would need to have as axioms the translations of
 - $A(\vec{t}) \rightarrow \exists \vec{x} A(\vec{x})$, and
 - $\forall \vec{x} A(\vec{x}) \rightarrow A(\vec{t})$,
where \vec{t} (resp. \vec{x}) is a countable sequence of terms (resp. variables free in $A(\vec{x})$).

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- Recall that $\exists x \exists y A(x, y)$ was translated as $A(t_0, t_1)$, where
 - $t_0 = \varepsilon_x A(x, \varepsilon_y A(x, y))$,
 - $t_1 = \varepsilon_y A(\varepsilon_x A(x, \varepsilon_y A(x, y))), y) = \varepsilon_y A(t_0, y)$.

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- There is a general pattern. For example, $\exists x \exists y \exists z A(x, y, z)$ is translated as $A(t_0, t_1, t_2)$, where letting
 - $s_0(y, z) = \varepsilon_x A(x, y, z)$,
 - $s_1(x, z) = \varepsilon_y A(x, y, z)$,
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 - $s_1(x, z) = \varepsilon_y A(x, y, z)$,
 - $s_2(x, y) = \varepsilon_z A(x, y, z)$;we have
 - $t_0 = s_0(s_1(x, s_2(x, y)), s_2(x, y))$,
 - $t_1 = s_1(t_0, s_2(t_0, y))$,
 - $t_2 = s_2(t_0, t_1)$.

- This leads us to define the translation of $\exists x_0 \exists x_1 \dots A(x_0, x_1, \dots)$ as $A(t_0, t_1, \dots)$, where
 - $s_i(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_{i+1}, \dots) = \varepsilon_{x_i} A(x_0, x_1, \dots)$
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- The (Hilbert-style) infinite ε -calculus can be defined by adding to $\mathcal{L}_{\omega_1, 0}$ the translations of all axioms of the form:
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 - $A(\vec{t}) \rightarrow \exists \vec{x} A(\vec{x})$, and
 - $\forall \vec{x} A(\vec{x}) \rightarrow A(\vec{t})$.
- (Convention: we assume that every atomic formula is of finite arity.)

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Theorem

Assume there are uncountably many Woodin cardinals. Then the infinite ε -calculus is conservative over (infinitary) propositional logic.

- It is to be expected that large cardinals are needed.
- This is because the language can express the determinacy of games of (fixed) countable length.

The ε -theorem

- To see this: suppose one has a proof of $A(s, t)$.

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- As before, one then derives $A(s, \varepsilon_y A(s, y))$ and, from it, the formula

$$A(\varepsilon_x A(x, \varepsilon_y(x, y)), \varepsilon_y A(\varepsilon_x A(x, \varepsilon_y(x, y)), y)) \quad (1)$$

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- However, suppose that $A(x, y)$ is of the form $B(x, \varepsilon_z \neg B(x, z, \varepsilon_y B(x, y, z))), y$.
- Then, (1) expresses something of the form $\exists x \forall z \exists y B(x, y, z)$.
- Thus, by only using rules that correspond to existential quantifiers, one can infer statements expressing infinite alternating strings of quantifiers.

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- It is to be interpreted as “if all the formulae in Γ are true, then some formula in Δ is true.”
- One builds up proofs of sequents by using *rules*. For example:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \Delta A}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta, A \vee B}$$

The Cut Rule

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- Gentzen's consistency proof for Peano Arithmetic: he defined a sequent calculus that is sound and complete for arithmetic, LK. Then he proved the *cut-elimination theorem*:

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Theorem (Gentzen)

If a sequent is provable in LK, then it is provable without the cut-rule.

Theorem

Let E be the reformulation of the infinite ε -calculus in terms of sequents. Then the following are equivalent:

- 1 *The ε -theorem holds for E .*
- 2 *The cut-elimination theorem holds for E .*
- 3 *All games of countable length with projective payoff are determined.*

One possible proof is based on interpreting a suitable first-order proof system inside E.

Theorem

There is an infinitary first-order sequent calculus F such that the following are equivalent:

- 1 *The cut-elimination theorem holds for F .*
- 2 *All games of countable length with projective payoff are determined.*

This in turn is based on a similar construction by Takeuti.

Theorem (Takeuti, 1970s)

There is an infinitary first-order sequent calculus D such that the following are equivalent for any transitive model M of $ZF+DC$:

- 1 $M \models$ “The cut-elimination theorem holds for D .”
- 2 $M \models AD$.

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Takeuti’s method also yields analogous results for, say, $AD_{\mathbb{R}}$ or PD .

Thank you.